SFS TeamA Core Requirement for a Secure U.S.-supervised Transition
KEY POINTS
- With Venezuela’s transition underway under U.S. oversight, Iran’s operational military capabilities pose an immediate threat requiring prioritization in the transition roadmap.
- Beyond UAVs sanctioned in December 2025, Iran has transferred anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and loitering munitions, creating multi-layered asymmetric warfare capability.
- These systems threaten U.S. forces, regional shipping, and allies while creating proliferation risks to terrorist organizations and narco-cartels.
- The transition must include immediate provisions for securing and dismantling Iranian capabilities to prevent use by Maduro loyalists or criminal organizations during power transfer.
On December 30, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions targeting the Iran-Venezuela drone pipeline, designating Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional S.A. (EANSA) and nine other individuals and entities for their role in transferring combat unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities between Tehran and Caracas. As the Center for a Secure Free Society observed, this marked the first time that the USG has publicly acknowledged that Iran has been using Venezuela as a proxy to wage war against the U.S. in our own hemisphere.
Now, as the United States oversees Venezuela’s democratic transition, these Iranian military capabilities present an immediate operational challenge. The sanctions were necessary, but designations cannot eliminate weapons already assembled, deployed, and integrated into Venezuelan military operations.
With the transition underway, Iran’s arsenal poses multiple threats: use by Maduro loyalists seeking to derail the process, proliferation to designated terrorist organizations and narco-trafficking networks, and potential employment against U.S. forces and regional partners supporting the transition.
The U.S. extraction operation that removed Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela demonstrated singular American military capabilities with direct relevance to the transition strategy. By integrating land, air, maritime, space, cyber, and intelligence assets, the United States rapidly neutralized Venezuela’s defensive posture, long considered among the strongest in Latin America, while denying the regime the ability to adapt.
The operation revealed the limits of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian-supplied systems, which proved ineffective against U.S. joint-domain dominance. However, Iran’s asymmetric arsenal, including drones and anti-ship capabilities, remains a latent risk during the transition. Dismantling these capabilities is therefore not optional, but a prerequisite for a transition that enhances regional and U.S. security.
This report examines the full scope of Iranian military capabilities now operational in Venezuela, their immediate risks during the transition period, and the urgent need for dismantlement provisions in the transition roadmap. The evidence demonstrates that Iran has not merely sold weapons to Venezuela; it has transferred technology, established production and maintenance facilities, embedded technical personnel, and exported its asymmetric warfare doctrine. The result is a self-sustaining capability that will outlast the Maduro regime unless actively dismantled as part of the transition process.
FROM POLITICAL ALLIANCE TO MILITARY CAPABILITY
The current operational capabilities emerged from foundations laid during Hugo Chávez’s presidency. As SFS analysis notes, it was under Chávez that Tehran gained regional depth through Caracas which opened channels, expanded Iran’s diplomatic presence, and served as a shepherd for Iran’s advance in the Western Hemisphere.
The partnership took the form of multiple bilateral agreements and memoranda, formally presented as economic and technological cooperation, but creating political and administrative cover for flows of people, equipment, and resources.
Key infrastructure established during this period includes the Caracas-Damascus-Tehran air corridor (nicknamed “Aeroterror”) expanded Iranian diplomatic and commercial presence including embassy personnel with technical and military backgrounds, establishment of joint ventures and cooperation agreements that obscured military technology transfer, and creation of production facilities at CAVIM for UAV assembly.
The Treasury sanctions reveal that Iran-Venezuela UAV cooperation dates to 2006. By 2012, Chávez publicly confirmed Venezuela was producing drones with Iranian, Russian, and Chinese assistance.
These early systems, rebranded as the Arpia/ANSU-100, were ostensibly for surveillance but established the industrial base, trained personnel, and normalized Iranian technical presence that would later support more advanced capabilities.
Under Nicolás Maduro, the relationship evolved from technology transfer to operational military capability. Three factors drove this escalation. First, Venezuela’s economic collapse (2014-2018) increased dependence on Iran for fuel, technical assistance, and sanctions evasion mechanisms.
Second, Maduro’s 2018 re-election amid international condemnation pushed Venezuela toward deeper alignment with Iran, Russia, and China as part of what the regime calls Multi-Polar Force Coalition. Third, the expiration of UN arms embargoes against Iran in October 2020 (conventional weapons) and October 2023 (missiles) removed legal constraints on transfers.
The 2020 establishment of EANSA formalized what had been ad-hoc operations. As a Conviasa subsidiary, EANSA operates at the intersection of commercial aviation and military logistics ideal for obscuring dual-use transfers. The company maintains UAV assembly facilities at El Libertador Air Base in Maracay, where Iranian technical personnel collaborate with Venezuelan counterparts.
Multiple photographic and video evidence from December 2025 and January 2026 confirms operational deployment of Iran’s Mohajer-6 combat UAV at El Libertador. Images circulated on social media show the distinctive platform on the tarmac, while video footage captures the drones during ground operations. Additional documentation from military parades and training exercises demonstrates Venezuelan forces actively operating these systems.
This represents the first conclusive public confirmation of strike-capable Iranian drones in Venezuelan service. The Mohajer-6 represents a qualitative leap from earlier surveillance platforms.
With 12-hour endurance, 2,400-kilometer range, and capability to carry four precision-guided munitions, it provides Venezuela with genuine ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and strike capability throughout the Caribbean basin and beyond.
THE ARSENAL: IRANIAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS NOW OPERATIONAL IN VENEZUELA
A. Unmanned Aerial Systems
Mohajer-6: The Combat Centerpiece
Confirmed operational at El Libertador Air Base, the Mohajer-6 is Iran’s most advanced UAV export. Treasury documents indicate EANSA has negotiated millions of dollars’ worth of Mohajer-6 acquisitions. Technical specifications include 12-hour endurance, 200 km/h maximum speed, 2,400 km range, 5,500-meter operational ceiling, and four hard points for precision munitions.
These UAVs can reach Puerto Rico (1,100 km), Curaçao (400 km), Panama Canal Zone (1,500 km), and Caribbean shipping lanes.
ANSU-100/Arpia and Zamora V-1
Treasury confirms EANSA supports ANSU-100 operations, claiming the platform can launch Iranian-designed Qaem guided bombs. The Zamora V-1, introduced in 2024 and modeled on Iran’s Shahed-136, represents the most concerning potential capability.
These one-way attack drones are designed for swarm operations. Iran claims Shahed-136 has 1,000-1,500-mile range, potentially placing Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and southern Florida within reach from Venezuelan territory.
B. Maritime Strike Systems
Peykaap-III Fast Attack Craft
In April 2021, IRINS Makran departed Iran carrying seven Peykaap-III fast attack craft. Venezuela took delivery of at least three vessels, now based at Puerto Cabello and Turiamo. These 17-meter boats, capable of 52 knots, carry two anti-ship missile launchers, two torpedo tubes, and heavy machine guns.
CM-90/Nasr-1 Anti-Ship Missile
Venezuela publicly unveiled CM-90 missiles during April 2024 military parades. The CM-90 is Iran’s export version of the Nasr-1 anti-ship cruise missile. With 90-kilometer range, Mach 0.8 speed, sea-skimming flight profile, and active radar guidance, these missiles create credible anti-ship capability.
The missiles have combat history Hezbollah used Nasr-1 to attack Israeli targets in October 2024, and the same missile family struck INS Hanit in 2006.
C. Command, Control, and Infrastructure
The weapons platforms require supporting infrastructure that Iran has methodically helped establish. El Libertador Air Base in Maracay serves as the UAV center of gravity, housing EANSA assembly and maintenance operations, Iranian technical personnel, flight operations, and weapons integration facilities. Naval facilities at Puerto Cabello and Turiamo Naval Station provide geographic dispersal.
In July 2020, Iranian operatives installed telecommunications antennas at Cerro San Telmo and military bases in Táchira State along the Colombian border, likely supporting UAV control networks for Battalion Tactical Groups operating in border regions.
The Caracas-Tehran air bridge has expanded significantly beyond the original YV1004 route that completed forty-one round trips in 2020. Flight data reveals sophisticated routing using multiple Conviasa aircraft. YV3535 and YV3545 both operated routes to Tehran during early 2025. Flight records show YV3535 completed Venezuela-Mexico-Iran routes via Cancun.
The Caracas-Tehran air bridge has expanded significantly beyond the original YV1004 route that completed 41 round trips in 2020. Flight data reveals sophisticated routing using multiple Conviasa aircraft. YV3535 and YV3545 both operated routes to Tehran during early 2025. Flight records show YV3535 completed Venezuela-Mexico-Iran routes via Cancun.
ADOPTION OF IRANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE
Iran has not simply sold weapons, it has exported doctrine. Defense analysts describe Venezuela’s military transformation as “Iranization”, meaning systematic adoption of IRGC asymmetric warfare concepts including swarm tactics using fast boats and UAVs, layered defense combining missiles, drones, and ground forces, dispersal and concealment, hit-and-run attacks, acceptance of high attrition in exchange for strategic effect, and use of proxy forces for deniability.
Venezuela’s Battalion Tactical Groups, incorporating Iranian and Russian advisors, explicitly integrate paramilitary forces including ELN, TdA, and FARC dissidents. Iran has successfully exported this model to Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza. Venezuela represents its first significant success in the Western Hemisphere.
The Treasury sanctions emphasize that EANSA maintains and oversees the assembly of UAVs and has directly negotiated with QAI, indicating technology transfer beyond simple purchases. The CM-90 workshop at Puerto Cabello similarly suggests domestic maintenance and possibly production capacity.
Iranian instructors at Venezuela’s National Experimental University of the Armed Forces train Venezuelan personnel in UAV technology. This creates sustainability even if sanctions prevent new Iranian shipments, Venezuela can maintain existing systems and potentially expand production using smuggled components.
When Ukrainian forces examined a captured Mohajer-6, they found 75 percent of components were foreign-origin, highlighting Iran’s reliance on international procurement networks that Venezuela can also tap.
THE TRANSITION CHALLENGE: WHY SANCTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH
The December 2025 Treasury sanctions represent important recognition of the threat, but designation cannot eliminate weapons already delivered, assembled, and operational. Any political transition in Venezuela must address these Iranian capabilities. Failure to do so creates multiple critical risks.
Significant uncertainties remain about the full scope of Iranian military presence. Any transition government will require comprehensive accounting through cooperation from Venezuelan military officers willing to provide information, access to facilities like El Libertador and Puerto Cabello for inspection, technical intelligence to verify claims and locate potentially dispersed systems, international verification mechanisms to ensure credibility, and sustained monitoring to detect hidden caches or resupply attempts.
Addressing Iran’s Venezuelan arsenal requires action across multiple fronts diplomatic pressure, interdiction operations, intelligence collection, and post-transition dismantlement provisions. The following recommendations follow SFS’s three-line framework: interdiction of the chain, regionalization of deterrence, and correct strategic framing.
The U.S. should expand designations to include additional EANSA personnel, CAVIM officials involved in UAV production, Conviasa executives managing the Tehran route, Venezuelan military officers at El Libertador and naval bases, front companies facilitating Iran-Venezuela transactions, and international brokers and procurement agents.
Target dual-use components flow through enhanced export controls with end-use verification requirements, work with European and Asian partners to close procurement loopholes and impose secondary sanctions on firms facilitating component transfers to Iran or Venezuela.
As SFS emphasizes, Latin American partners need to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Currently only a handful of countries in the region have done so, creating a safe haven for Iranian proxy networks.
Make Hezbollah designation a priority in regional dialogues and link designation to security assistance and intelligence sharing.
Enhance intelligence cooperation through establishment of a regional intelligence fusion center focused on the Iran-Venezuela threat, sharing of imagery and signals intelligence, coordination of human intelligence collection, and development of a common threat picture.
Strengthen customs and border controls to disrupt procurement networks and Iranian personnel movements through provision of training and equipment for border security forces, development of watch lists, screening of cargo manifests for dual-use items, and establishment of rapid information sharing on suspicious border crossings.
As SFS documentation demonstrates, Iran-Venezuela cooperation cannot be understood in isolation from Russian and Chinese roles. The three powers operate through hybrid warfare, criminal convergence, and coordinated pressure on U.S. interests. Russia provides BTG training, air defense systems, and military advisors.
China supplies electronics, dual-use technology, and economic support. Iran brings asymmetric warfare doctrine, missile/drone transfers, and proxy networks. Policy responses must address all three simultaneously.
Treat Iran-Venezuela as a military infrastructure threat requiring security responses. Recognize Venezuela as a replicable model requiring preventive action elsewhere. Understanding this pattern enables preventive action through identification of early warning indicators (expanded Iranian diplomatic presence, bilateral military agreements, suspicious cargo flights/shipments).
DISMANTLEMENT OF IRANIAN PRESENCE AS A TRANSITION PRIORITY
This arsenal threatens U.S. military forces supporting the transition throughout the Caribbean, commercial shipping approaching the Panama Canal, regional allies with limited air defense capabilities, and creates proliferation risks to designated terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks.
During the transition period, these capabilities could be used by Maduro loyalists to provoke crises and undermine the process, by paramilitaries to retain leverage in post-transition negotiations, or by cartels as force multipliers to protect trafficking operations.
The policy response must move beyond sanctions to a comprehensive approach following SFS’s framework: interdiction of the chain, regionalization of deterrence, and correct strategic framing recognizing VRIC as an integrated threat.
Most critically, the transition roadmap must explicitly address Iranian military capabilities with concrete timelines and verification mechanisms.
The stakes extend beyond Venezuela. Iran is watching how the United States manages Iranian military assets during this transition. Successful dismantlement, transparently verified and completed within the transition timeline, would demonstrate that Iran cannot maintain military footholds in the Western Hemisphere when regimes change. Failure would invite Iranian attempts to preserve capabilities through hidden caches, sleeper networks, or rapid reconstitution once international attention shifts.
The transition period presents both opportunity and risk. Opportunity because regime change creates political space for dismantlement that would be impossible under Maduro. Risk because the transition period’s inherent instability could enable weapons proliferation, use by spoilers, or Iranian evacuation of the most sensitive systems and personnel.
Acting decisively during the transition window when Maduro’s grip has weakened but before successor arrangements fully solidify offers the best chance to reverse two decades of Iranian military penetration.
The December 2025 sanctions marked recognition. The transition process must now deliver action. That requires embedding dismantlement in the transition roadmap with specific benchmarks, providing U.S. technical assistance for safe weapons removal, securing international verification through OAS or UN mechanisms, coordinating regional intelligence to prevent proliferation, and maintaining sustained oversight beyond the formal transition period.
Venezuela is Iran’s bridgehead. The transition provides the opportunity to dismantle it. But that opportunity is time-limited and requires prioritization alongside other transition challenges.
The question is whether U.S. policymakers will treat Iranian capabilities as the immediate security threat they represent or allow them to persist as a problem for post-transition Venezuela to address by which point the window may have closed.
