VRIC MONITOR No. 30 | Avoiding War

Why did President Donald Trump highlight the Panama Canal, the Gulf of America, and even Greenland in his inaugural address? Critics dismissed it as imperial bravado. However, these seemingly disparate regions form an essential “Security Arc” for U.S. trade, energy, and food security. From melting ice routes in the Arctic to chokepoints like the Panama Canal, these zones are quietly under siege, not by any formal army but by satellites, infrastructure encroachment, and proxies. Through his America First policy, President Trump is doing more than just defending his country’s interests by prioritizing these areas. Protecting strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere is fundamental to ensuring trade stability, economic growth, and food security on a global scale. Contrary to propaganda from America’s adversaries, America first does not mean “America alone”. When the United States safeguards its own stability and security, it acts as a force multiplier for peace and security worldwide.

In February 2023, Chinese spy balloons were detected in U.S. airspace, while similar devices were also spotted in Latin America, more specifically in Central America and the Caribbean. Simultaneously, two Iranian warships reached South America, entering Brazil’s port of Rio de Janeiro. As described in the previous edition of this VRIC Monitor, the two events are linked. The team at the Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) identified the simultaneous encirclement of maritime chokepoints by Chinese balloons and Iranian ships. These are not coincidences. The Iranian warships sailed through the Strait of Hormuz, through which 30 percent of the world’s oil passes, and the Strait of Malacca, through which 25 percent of all global trade passes. Meanwhile, the Chinese balloons flew over the Bering Strait and the Panama Canal. These events are not coincidental.

The VRICs allies are seeking to expand their maritime influence and challenge the existing international order by taking coordinated action. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has invested heavily in global port infrastructure, including in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). This raises concerns about the potential dual use of infrastructure projects like the Port of Chancay, a deep-water port inaugurated with a $3.5 billion investment from the Chinese shipping company COSCO. Although the operator is officially a state-owned civil company, the Chinese Communist Party promotes military-civil fusion strategies for all Chinese companies, which are forced by the 2017 National Intelligence Law to share data on shipping records and align with CCP military strategy. This network of dual-use ports could provide an extensive infrastructure system for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

Russia has strengthened military ties with Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, including the deployment of military forces to the region. At the May 2025 XIII International Security Summit hosted in Moscow, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu called to reactive a five-way Russia-Cuba-Venezuela-Bolivia-Nicaragua security consultation forum. This follows Russian sales of helicopters, planes, and anti-aircraft systems to Nicaragua in February 2025 and the establishment of a Russian helicopter repair center in Peru in April 2025. In terms of economics, Moscow has sought to undermine the dominance of the U.S. dollar by establishing a new currency with the BRICS member countries. These recent events and the Trump administration’s current response are only the most visible parts of an underdiscussed influence war in the Western Hemisphere. Historic neglect by the West has allowed the members of the VRIC alliance to advance on strategic points that the United States has listed as priorities. The Trump administration must now act on these threats.

On September 5, 2025, the president signed an executive order to restore the historic name “Department of War” as a secondary title for the Department of Defense. This change resets the strategic framework, clearly stating that the department’s mission is to prepare for war to prevent it. The new title is starker, yet it clarifies deterrence by signaling credible capability and resolve. Historically, war has been the prevailing norm, while peace has been regarded as the interlude between conflicts. To secure peace, the United States must demonstrate strength and prevent adversaries from mistaking restraint for weakness. In this sense, adopting the title “Department of War” acknowledges this reality, aligning language with the “victory without war” posture of peace through strength.

This edition of the VRIC Monitor explores how the Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and PRC alliance continues to challenge U.S. strategic dominance through hybrid warfare, maritime encirclement, and criminal convergence. This report analyzes the geostrategic importance of the Panama Canal, the Gulf of America, and the Arctic. Collectively, these areas form a “Security Arc” that is crucial to safeguarding U.S. national security, trade, energy flows, and the stability of global supply chains. This report also details the role of asymmetric warfare, including weaponized migration, disinformation, and state-sponsored narco-trafficking, in destabilizing American society and diverting U.S. resources. Against the backdrop of the Israel-Iran conflict, this VRIC Monitor posits that the Trump administration’s restrained military posture and precision strikes exemplify a “victory without war” strategy, neutralizing threats while avoiding prolonged conflict.

Between the summer and fall of 2010, only four ships crossed the Northern Sea Route (NSR) between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. That year, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) exchanged 100,000 tons of cargo. In 2024, these same powers set two records on the NSR within the same period of time. Russia and the PRC facilitated a total of 97 crossings alone, transporting 3.08 million tons of cargo exclusively between Russia and PRC, and vice versa. This surge in Sino-Russian Arctic activity signifies more than just logistical advancements; it represents a deliberate shift in naval strategy, establishing the NSR as a potential arena for future strategic competition.

Although this reality seems far in the future, the competition for the most favorable portion of the Arctic has already begun. The struggle for control of resources is growing and demands a network of U.S. strategic outposts, such as ports and military installations, to rival the regional gains of adversaries. Russia and the PRC are advanced in exploiting the NSR. Moscow has reactivated and modernized old Soviet bases to expand its military presence in the Arctic, as it seeks to build an energy outpost called the Snowflake International Arctic Station.

Additionally, the Kremlin has opened its polar borders to the PRC. According to the Russian state news agency Sputnik, Moscow is considering the possibility of PRC’s warships patrolling the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which suggests a strategic alliance between Moscow and Beijing to dominate new trade routes. One project that the two countries have made public is the construction of a dual-purpose power plant to supply military and logistics facilities in the NSR.

In the fall of 2024, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) spotted two Russian Border Guard ships and two Chinese Coast Guard ships during a routine patrol over the Bering Sea. This was the first joint military operation the U.S. Coast Guard has ever encountered this was the farthest north. The fact that PRC spy balloons also flew over this same area in 2023 is not a coincidence. Simultaneously, Russia and the PRC launched a regular shipping corridor along the Arctic Sea lanes, reducing the distance and time required for cargo transportation between the two nations That year, 79 voyages of cargo ships, cruise ships, and oil tankers reached Chinese ports via the Arctic waterway, also known as the “Polar Silk Road”, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Beijing’s growing interest in Arctic routes is one of its responses to the “Malacca Dilemma”. About 65 percent% of PRC’s total foreign trade is directly and heavily reliant on the Strait of Malacca. According to Chinese strategists, this dependency poses one of the biggest threats to economic security in the event of war. In the scenario of a confrontation with the U.S. or Indian navies, the Chinese fear its adversaries blocking its shipping lanes to the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. To mitigate this strategic weakness, the PRC has taken various actions, including forming an alliance with Russia to expand NSR shipping routes and massively militarizing the South China Sea by constructing artificial islands and military bases. Once Beijing’s “Malacca dilemma” is resolved, it will reduce its obstacles to escalating decisive military actions, such as an invasion of Taiwan or conflicts with neighbors like the Philippines.

The Panama Canal is a crucial crossing point for international maritime trade. It is estimated that 6 percent (US$2 trillion) of global maritime trade ships through its locks. The United States is the main destination, receiving 28 percent of the canal’s cargo. The canal is so important for U.S. foreign and domestic trade that 40 percent of U.S. container traffic, valued at approximately $270 billion per year, passes through it. Disruptions to the canal’s operations could have devastating consequences for the American and global economies.

“Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.” Sir Walter Raleigh (1552-1618)

Chinese companies’ control over the ports at both ends of the Panama Canal and their dominance of the Colón Free Trade Zone, the largest in Latin America, are unequivocal signals of the Chinese Communist Party’s influence over canal operations through state-owned companies. Evidence suggests that the PRC is interfering with the Canal in an undue manner, thereby violating the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which guarantees the Canal’s permanent neutrality and openness to ships of all nations.

Infiltration by the PRC into the administration of the Panama Canal reached critical levels with the presence of individuals directly tied to the CCP. From 2019 to 2022, Tung Chee-wen, a Chinese tycoon, served on the Panama Canal Consultative Council. Tung is the brother and business partner of Tung Chee-hwa, who is well-known for his connections with the CCP. Tung Chee-hwa, former Chief Executive of Hong Kong and current vice-chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), plays a pivotal role in the CCP’s strategy to project influence abroad. Although the CPPCC does not wield legislative authority, it functions as an advisory body that amplifies PRC’s messaging on key international fronts. In 2018, the Tung brothers sold 68.7 percent of their shipping company to China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO Shipping), a state-owned enterprise. Following this transaction, Wang Haimin, the current vice president of COSCO, served on the Canal’s Advisory Board from 2019 to 2022.

The Panamanian authorities categorically deny that the Torrijos-Carter Treaties’ principle of neutrality has been violated, yet the state-owned companies COSCO and Hutchison Whampoa, both operating on the Panama Canal, are extensions of the PLA. Under China’s civil-military fusion strategy, COSCO subtly advances the strategic goals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. The company provides the PLA with an extensive logistics network that enables it to project naval power beyond its direct area of influence. With a fleet of over 400 container ships and hundreds of other vessels connecting 558 ports worldwide, COSCO extends the PLA’s arms worldwide.

In 2019, China successfully demonstrated a Chinese Navy frigate refueling on the high seas with the use of COSCO container ships. This enabled the frigate to operate on the open ocean. COSCO supports the PLA Navy escort and evacuation operations, as well as solving logistics and supply problems in waters beyond the Chinese Navy’s own capabilities.

The Gulf of America Coast produces 14 percent of the U.S.’s crude oil. Over 48 percent of the country’s total oil refining capacity and 51 percent of its natural gas processing plant capacity are located along the Gulf Coast. In September 2024, Gulf oil production fell by 12 percent, the lowest figure in years, due to the prolonged closure of several facilities caused by Hurricanes Francine and Helene. This disruption led to a temporary spike in domestic fuel prices, increased pressure on strategic petroleum reserves, and delays in key exports. These environmental shocks revealed how vulnerable U.S. energy infrastructure is to sudden disruptions. A regional conflict could push Gulf oil production even lower than 12 percent, triggering broader ramifications for the U.S. economy, including supply chain instability, inflationary pressures, and weakened energy security.

The probability of war in the Gulf of America is low due to the United States’ military dominance in the region. However, the assertive actions of the United States’ adversaries, both regional and extra-regional, cannot be overlooked. Regional adversaries include Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, while extra-regional adversaries include Russia, Iran, and China—the other members of the VRIC alliance. These adversaries may be looking for ways to threaten U.S. stability, such as through a maritime blockade similar to China’s “Malacca Dilemma,” which could result in an economic catastrophe. This possibility is known as the “Gulf Dilemma.”

In June 2024, a Russian nuclear submarine and four warships passed within 200 miles of the Florida coast en route to military exercises in Cuba. Located at the entrance to the Gulf of America, Cuba offers Moscow a strategic platform to project naval power in close proximity to U.S. territory. Such deployments are designed to demonstrate geopolitical resolve, test U.S. response readiness, and signal support for allied governments. Russia has used similar maneuvers in the past: in November 2008, the nuclear-powered battlecruiser Pyotr Veliky and the destroyer Admiral Chabanenko visited Venezuela for joint naval exercises, and in March 2019, the frigate Admiral Gorshkov and the nuclear-powered submarine Kazan conducted anti-submarine warfare and air defense drills with Venezuelan forces.

Beyond Moscow’s military signaling, Cuba also hosts a significant signals intelligence (SIGINT) program aimed at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) operations in the Gulf of America. This program, funded by the PRC and possibly other VRIC members, collects and relays sensitive information on U.S. naval deployments, communications, and logistics. Operating in close coordination with foreign intelligence partners, Cuba’s espionage infrastructure provides adversaries with a valuable strategic advantage, enhancing the effectiveness of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian maritime activities in the region.

The Gulf of America is important to the stability of the United States, and this importance goes beyond its strategic value for energy supply. Twelve of the twenty largest U.S. ports, by cargo volume, are in the Gulf of America. By 2022, 52 percent of all cargo tonnage handled by American ports will have passed through the Gulf. The United States exports approximately one-quarter of the grain it produces. In 2019, approximately 55 percent of U.S. grain export shipments departed from the U.S. Gulf region. The Gulf of America is also a major contributor to U.S. seafood production, providing approximately 40 percent of our domestic seafood.

The Gulf of America is a strategically important area for defending the United States. It is a critical location for military and national security operations. Its proximity to countries such as Mexico and Cuba, as well as the regional operation of U.S. military bases, makes the region vital for surveillance and the protection of American territory. Any threat to the Gulf’s stability could compromise national defense, so maintaining a robust military presence and cooperating with neighboring nations is essential to ensuring regional security.

The United States deployed warships to the Caribbean as part of a campaign against transnational cartels. The move pursues two strategic aims: it degrades the finances of the criminal networks that feed Caracas’s repressive apparatus, and it puts direct pressure on Nicolás Maduro’s regime. Within a “victory without war” approach, the naval presence, paired with ISR assets, the Coast Guard, and cooperation with neighboring states, seals maritime corridors for cocaine and chemical precursors, raises criminal logistics costs, and blocks the entry of sanctioned components such as drones, missiles, and electronics. At the same time, it creates credible deterrence against adventurism in the Essequibo, limits the regime’s use of migration flows as a weapon, and tightens control over the maritime arc that links the Gulf of America to the Panama Canal.

The war between Israel and Iran has destabilized the Middle East, creating strategic challenges for global powers. The VRIC countries (Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and China) have exploited this turmoil to create division within the United States by spreading disinformation. VRIC operatives circulated a false narrative on social media claiming that President Donald Trump would abandon his “America First” policy if the United States entered the war. Conversely, they claimed that if he refrained from action, he would be seen as betraying a historic ally and alienating a significant portion of his political base, many of whom have strong ties to Israel and the Jewish community. This carefully crafted narrative sought to corner the U.S. president in a lose-lose dilemma, eroding public trust, deepening partisan divides, and amplifying tensions within key voter groups — precisely the type of VRIC-driven psychological and political disruption that hybrid warfare aims to achieve.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated that the United States was not paralyzed by this false dilemma. By precisely targeting facilities central to Iran’s nuclear program, the U.S. disrupted Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and dismantled the VRIC disinformation campaign. After exhausting all diplomatic channels, these strikes revealed the Trump administration’s firm resolve to avoid a prolonged war that would entail significant economic and human costs for the American people – a sharp example of what it means to achieve victory without war.

In recent decades, Iran has dramatically expanded its strategic footprint in Latin America, forging deep ties with authoritarian and populist regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Through its proxy, Hezbollah, Iran has developed political influence operations, paramilitary structures, and illicit financing schemes tied to drug trafficking and money laundering, particularly in regions with weak governance, such as the Tri-Border Area. However, this expansion carries the risk of reigniting dormant regional conflicts, such as the territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana. This could draw U.S. resources into new crises and further destabilize the region.

Iran’s growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, amplified by its official BRICS membership and intensified high-level diplomatic visits, reflects a calculated strategy to project power. Through direct involvement with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah’s operational networks, Tehran has established a robust logistical and operational platform. This enhances Iran’s ability to conduct hybrid and asymmetric operations against U.S. interests while exacerbating local crises and territorial disputes.

The United States deployed warships to the Caribbean as part of a campaign against transnational cartels. The move pursues two strategic aims: it degrades the finances of the criminal networks that feed Caracas’s repressive apparatus, and it puts direct pressure on Nicolás Maduro’s regime. Within a “victory without war” approach, the naval presence, paired with ISR assets, the Coast Guard, and cooperation with neighboring states, seals maritime corridors for cocaine and chemical precursors, raises criminal logistics costs, and blocks the entry of sanctioned components such as drones, missiles, and electronics. At the same time, it creates credible deterrence against adventurism in the Essequibo, limits the regime’s use of migration flows as a weapon, and tightens control over the maritime arc that links the Gulf of America to the Panama Canal.

The Maduro regime serves as a strategic outpost for non-regional adversaries, allowing them to pose asymmetrical threats to the Western Hemisphere. As Iran’s closest ally in the region, Venezuela serves as a base for Tehran’s covert operations. Should the dispute with Guyana over Essequibo escalate, it could trigger a regional conflict with ripple effects across Latin America, ranging from destabilizing migratory flows to disrupting operations at the Panama Canal.

Maduro exports chaos as a strategy. By fueling regional instability, he diverts U.S. attention and resources away from countering transnational threats. A clear example of this is the Tren de Aragua gang, which has infiltrated migrant flows and spread throughout the Americas, including the United States.

The Catatumbo region, located on the Colombia-Venezuela border, has become a new hotbed of regional instability and a hub for converging threats, including state-sponsored trafficking, insurgent groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, and global criminal networks. Catatumbo generates profits of US$5.9 billion per year for the Maduro regime with 22.5 percent of Colombia’s coca production.

Maduro aims to minimize intermediaries and consolidate drug routes under the regime’s direct control. This strategy mirrors the Vietnam War-style use of North and South Vietnam’s Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which hosted several clandestine operations. One covert strategy is the proposal to create a Binational Special Economic Zone of the Border. Maduro and his Colombian counterpart, President Gustavo Petro, are advancing this project under the pretext of stabilization; however, Maduro is actually protecting trafficking routes. By embedding these trafficking corridors within a state-sanctioned economic framework, the regime can mask illicit flows as legitimate trade, complicating detection by law enforcement and securing long-term control over one of the most profitable segments of its criminal economy.

Catatumbo is on the route of the Venezuelan migrants to reach the Darién Gap, a jungle corridor connecting Colombia and Panama. From 2020 to 2024, approximately one million migrants traversed this dangerous route to cross the southern border of the United States. The intersection of human trafficking and drug trafficking demonstrates how Venezuela’s regime operates transnational crime networks and engages in asymmetrical actions against the United States. The regime provides drugs, on an industrial scale, that increase the power of Mexican cartels to generate violence and crises on the Southern border.

Drug trafficking now serves as both a funding mechanism and a strategic weapon. In 2023 alone, over 105,000 people in the U.S. died from overdoses. This figure is thirteen times higher than the average number of Americans killed per year in the Vietnam War. Of those deaths, 29,000 were cocaine-related – more than the total number of casualties in the Korean War. These deaths are not collateral damage; they are the result of a calculated asymmetric strategy.

Maduro’s alliances with the PRC and Russia strengthen his ability to resist Western sanctions and expand criminal activities. These countries provide strategic support in various ways. For example, China assists Venezuela with financial protection, facilitating sanctions evasion and money laundering operations for the regime. Russia provides military training and logistical support for Venezuelan forces, enabling the militarization of security along trafficking routes. The Iranian regime provides expertise in clandestine networks and asymmetric warfare through its proxies and uses Venezuela to increase its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Beyond logistical, financial, and intelligence support, the extraregional VRIC nations are equipping Venezuela with advanced weapons systems that transform it into a forward-operating platform for their power projection. At the heart of this build-up is deep military cooperation with Tehran. Iran has used the Caracas-Tehran axis to establish a state-sponsored sanctuary just three hours’ flying time from the United States, complete with IRGC-Quds Force engineers advising on Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, air-defense network, and weapons programs. Using near-weekly Mahan Air and Conviasa flights into a customs-free hangar at Simón Bolívar International Airport, Iran has moved technicians, cash, and sanctioned materiel directly into the country. This pipeline has enabled the local production of Iranian-designed UAVs, beginning with the “Arpía-001” in 2012 and expanding to a dedicated EANSA assembly line beside El Libertador Air Base. Current output is estimated at 50 Mohajer-2 derivatives (ANSU-100) annually, alongside components for the stealthier Shahed-171 clone (ANSU-200). With an operational range of roughly 150 km, ANSU-100 squadrons can place Guyana’s offshore Stabroek Block and even sea-lanes toward Puerto Rico within strike distance. According to Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Iran has already shipped precision-guided munitions for these drones, effectively stationing “armed drones on America’s doorstep.”

Complementing its drone fleet, Venezuela has received at least a dozen Iranian Peykaap-III fast-attack craft — locally rebranded as Zolfaghar — each 17 meters long, capable of 55 knots, and armed with twin launch tubes for Nasr-1/CM-90 anti-ship cruise missiles with a 90 km range. Open-source imagery confirms deliveries in 2023 and late 2024, adding to earlier Peykaap-II transfers. These vessels, adapted to Iran’s “wolf-pack” swarm doctrine, have already been used in Venezuelan drills in the Gulf of Paria and off the disputed Essequibo coast, where they were paired with Iranian-origin loitering munitions in saturation-strike exercises. IRGC advisers openly describe this build-up as creating “Houthis of the Caribbean” — a hybrid naval threat combining missile-armed boats, kamikaze drones, and naval mines designed to deny U.S. and allied fleets uncontested access to the southern Atlantic. Once deployed from Venezuela’s coastline, these systems put not only Guyanese territory but also critical U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) installations in the Caribbean and Gulf of America within strike range, giving extra-regional adversaries a potent maritime and aerial strike capability in the Western Hemisphere.

The strategic manipulation of immigration flows has become an increasingly potent asymmetric tactic used by regimes hostile to the United States. Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela is a prime example of this tactic, as the country has deliberately facilitated mass migration toward the U.S. southern border, creating humanitarian crises and exacerbating social tensions within American communities. These migration surges have placed immense strain on U.S. resources, provoked political polarization, and contributed to episodes of civil unrest, including the significant urban riots of 2024.

However, Venezuela is not merely a failed state; Maduro made your regime a launchpad for asymmetric operations that directly target U.S. homeland security. During the riots, several major American cities experienced unprecedented levels of violence and social disruption. Subsequent investigations revealed that foreign disinformation campaigns and intentional logistical support for migrants via criminal networks connected to the Maduro regime and its extra-regional allies substantially contributed to escalating tensions. By leveraging immigration as a geopolitical weapon, adversaries have successfully fostered internal instability in the United States, showcasing a new dimension of hybrid warfare tactics employed by the VRIC countries.

Taken together, the Arctic, Panama Canal, and the Gulf of America represent more than geographic features. They form a security arc whose disruption could shift the global balance of power. As VRIC adversaries deploy hybrid tactics, only sustained strategic foresight, alliances, and proactive measures will preserve American security and sovereignty.